


# ICDCS 2021



## **LDSP: Shopping with Cryptocurrency Privately and Quickly under Leadership**

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# Shopping with Cryptocurrency?

## Slow

- Bitcoins takes **10 mins** to include a payment transaction
- (**~60 mins** to confirm)

## Low Privacy

- All transactions are **exposed** on the blockchain

# Traditional Layer-2 Networks

## 😊 Low-latency Payment

- Payer & payee confirm their payment “locally” (off-chain)
  - jointly-sign a balance sheet of their (updating) asset & sync “on-chain” later

## 😞 High collateral: money locked (mostly) for a *single* payee

## 😞 Constantly-Online Requirement

- Payers & payees need to monitor the on-chain transactions
  - worry that the other party might upload an “**outdated**” balance sheet

## 😞 (Still) Low Privacy

- The final balance sheet is exposed on the blockchain
  - total **transaction amount** & **who paid to whom** are leaked



# Snappy: Layer-2 Solution for Retail

- *Unidirectional* system tailored for *retail* payments [NDSS 20]
  - Users take the role of either **customer**/payer or **merchant**/payee

😊 **Low-latency** Payment Solution (~ layer-2)

😊 **Offline** Customer (no need to monitor on-chain)

- Merchant has **disincentive** in uploading **outdated** sheet
  - Penalty from their collaterals

😊 **Low Collaterals**

- Customer collateral is “**shared**” among all merchants in Snappy

# Shortcomings of Snappy

☹️ No Privacy (Merchants share **all** Payer Spending Histories)

- State = all payer's spending histories
- Merchants also serve as statekeepers
- Confirmation needs **51%** of merchants to vouch
  - **Each** checks the balance of the payer
  - **pays back** from their collateral if vouched wrongly
    - e.g., a double-spending transaction

# LDSP: Layer-2 Anonymous Payment

## 😊 Low Latency

- **Speedy confirmation** of off-chain payment within *seconds*

## 😊 Dynamic and Distributed Setup

- Merchants (payees) can join and leave dynamically
- Customers (payers) can pay multiple merchants

## 😊 Scalable On-chain Processes



- Our design naturally supports **batching** to *reduce on-chain costs*

## 😊 Privacy

- Customers (payers) can **hide their identities**
- They can “hide in the crowd” to obfuscate the payment amount


# Core Entities in LDSP

- Customers, who want to pay merchants (off-chain)
- A consortium, formed by a group of merchants
- A *leader*, leading the consortium
- An arbiter (smart contract), for resolving disputes, etc.



# Workflow (& Core Functions)

1. Customers withdraw LDSP coins by funding them on-chain
2. Customers spend (off-chain) LDSP coins to a merchant
3. Customers refund unspent LDSP coins
4. Merchants bookkeep and deposit the received LDSP coins to receive the on-chain coins (funded by customers)





# Dilemma: Who issue LDSP coins?

- **All** merchants (or statekeepers) are needed to issue coins
  - Not scalable!
- **Only 1** merchant (or statekeeper) is needed to issue coins
  - Keep issuing coins to a “customer” to be spent at victim merchant
  - Becomes a **money-printing factory!**
- **A large subset** of them needed to issue coins
  - The worst of both worlds?
  - Need **many** to help, but they can still **collude**
  - Or is it?

# High-Level Operations of LDSP

- We introduce *leaders*, each leads a group of merchants
- Merchants in a group *jointly* issue coins, forming a “*virtual bank*”
- A coin can either be spent with the issuing merchant
- or at another merchant, which we call *cross-group payments*

# Leader's Duties and Motivation

- settles w/ other leaders for **cross-group payments**
- confirms payment (in its group) to avoid double-spending
- motivations: getting service fees, establishing partnerships

# Highlights of LDSP

- **Small group size**, which mitigates the scalability problem
- State = which merchant gets back how many LDSP coins
  - Formed by “consensus” between the leaders and the merchants
- Merchants can belong to different “**virtual banks**”
  - *i.e.*, the groups forming the banks are *overlapping*
- Merchants, who are payees, have **no incentive** to forge

# Design Intuition (Merchant Perspective)

- Self-evolving ecosystem
- We leverage the “business relationship” among merchants to help their beloved customers.
- Somewhat like how inter-bank transactions are cleared
  - *“I know this virtual bank well. I’ll just accept its coins.”*
  - *“I’m not familiar with this bank. Let me talk to them first before accepting too many coins issued by them.”*

# Design Intuition (Customer Perspective)

- Somewhat similar to customer-loyalty programs
- Think of the coins as the “points”/“mileages”
- *“I frequent these shops. Let me get more coins from them.”*
- *“I may occasionally buy this each month. I’ll get less here.”*
- LDSP coins are partially blind signatures from a group
- “80/20 rule”: trade a bit of privacy for better efficiency




# A bit more details

Withdrawal, Payment, Refund, ...

# Customer's Withdrawal

- The customer funds LDSP coins via the arbiter
- The customer uploads a blinded  $h(sn)$  w/ an on-chain coin
  - $h$ : crypto hash function,  $sn$ : (random) serial number
- The merchants *jointly* sign, *blindfolded*, on the  $h(sn)$  as  $S_{sn}$
- The customer gets the signature  $S_{sn}$  as an LDSP coin






# Payer Privacy

- Basically, we adopt a multi-blind signature approach
- Hide the link btw. on-chain coins & LDSP (off-chain) coins
- The customers thus hide among those spending coins from the same virtual bank


# Customer's off-chain Payment

- Customer reveals the signed  $h(sn)$  to the merchant & leader
- The leader confirms it with its signature  $\sigma_{sn}$
- The customer reveals  $sn$  to the merchant




# Customer's Refund

- The customer uploads the opening for  $h(sn)$  to the arbiter
- If  $sn$  has been spent, the merchant can reveal  $sn$  to debunk
- If no dispute, the customer gets back the on-chain coin



# Merchants' Bookkeeping (& Why no Double-Spending)

- The leader releases all payment records in batch
  - which is uploaded to the arbiter after the merchants *jointly* signing on it
- The leader will be blamed if any double-spent coin is spotted
- The merchants can deposit all bookkept coins altogether later




# LDSP's Safety (No one loses money)

- Safety of the Customers:
  - They can always refund an unspent coin
- Safety of the Merchants:
  - For double-spending, they can blame the leader for compensation
  - No merchant can mint coin w/o the signature of all other merchants

# Low-Latency Payment & Low On-Chain Cost

- Off-chain payment with  $< 512$  coins is done in  $< 0.5s$ 
  - Urban Network: 100 Mbps Bandwidth,  $\sim 20ms$  Latency



- Low on-chain cost

Operation	Gas (on Ethereum)	USD
Baseline	21000/tx	3.72/tx
(Batched) Withdrawal	38.36/coin	0.0068/coin
(Batched) Refund	25.76/coin	0.0046/coin

based on the average gas price and exchange rate on 1 May, 2021

# Summary

- **LDSP**: Shopping with Cryptocurrency *Privately* and *Quickly* under “Consortium Leadership”
  - a **L**ow Latency, **D**ynamic & **D**istributed System
  - w/ **S**calable On-chain Process, & **P**ayer **P**rivacy
- What’s more in the paper:
  - The use of round and epoch
  - Keeping a low on-chain cost via batching
  - Analysis on LDSP’s safety & liveness
  - How LDSP achieves low collaterals, avoids single-point-of-failure, *etc.*
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